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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: THE LIMITS OF A PATIENT'S
RIGHT TO REFUSE MEDICAL TREATMENT
In re Dubreuil, 629 So. 2d 819 (Fla. 1993)
Troy Rillo*
Respondent sought an emergency declaratory judgment to determine
whether it had the authority or the duty to administer life-saving blood
transfusions to petitioner.' Petitioner refused to consent to the transfusions,2 arguing that she had a constitutional right to refuse medical treatment Respondent argued that the blood transfusions should be authorized to prevent petitioner from abandoning her minor children.4 The trial
court agreed with respondent and authorized the transfusions.5 The Fourth
District Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's judgment.' The Florida
Supreme Court accepted jurisdiction,7 quashed the district court's judgment,' and HELD, respondent presented insufficient evidence to prove
that petitioner would abandon her children if she were to die.9

Courts have held that a patient has a constitutional right to refuse
medical treatment." Courts also have held, however, that a state may
have a superior interest which may limit the patient's right to refuse treatment." Preventing minor children from being abandoned is one State in* I dedicate this comment to my wonderful wife, Ana, who made the last three years of law
school tolerable and whose sacrifices so often go unappreciated.
1. In re Dubreuil, 629 So. 2d 819, 821 (Fla. 1993). Respondent, the South Broward Hospital
District, originally petitioned the court for declaratory judgment on behalf of Memorial Hospital. Id. at
821 n.4.
2. Id. at 820. Petitioner refused to consent to the transfusions because of her religious beliefs.
Id.
3. Id. at 821. Petitioner argued that her state and federal constitutional rights of privacy, bodily
self-determination, and religious freedom encompassed the right to refuse medical treatment. Id.
4. Id. at 824. Although the State was not properly joined as a party, respondent asserted the
State's interests. Id.
5. Id. at 821. After the trial court authorized the transfusions, petitioner moved for rehearing in
order to prove that her children would be properly cared for if she died. Id. The trial court denied
petitioner's motion for rehearing. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 822. By the time this appeal was heard, petitioner had received blood transfusions and
was released from the hospital. Id. Thus, the issue presented had become moot Id. However, the Florida Supreme Court accepted jurisdiction because the issue presented was of great public importance,
likely to recur, and might have otherwise evaded review. Id.
8. Id. at 828.
9. Id. The court reasoned that the district court erred by presuming the children would be abandoned in the absence of proof to the contrary. Id.
10. See, e.g., Rasmussen v. Fleming, 741 P.2d 674, 682 (Ariz. 1987); Satz v. Perlmutter, 379 So.
2d 359, 360 (Fla. 1980).
11. See, e.g., In re Guardianship of Browning, 568 So. 2d 4, 14 (Fla. 1990); Rasmussen, 741
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terest that may limit the patient's right to refuse medical treatment. 2 In
the interest of the minor children, the State may seek to compel a patient
to receive unwanted medical treatment. 3 The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit addressed this issue in In re
President & Directors of Georgetown College.'4
In Georgetown, a single judge ordered an emergency writ authorizing
a hospital to administer potentially life-saving blood transfusions. 5 The
judge found that the patient would abandon her minor child if she were to
die. 6 According to the judge, the State had an interest in preventing this
outcome because the State would have to assume the responsibility for the
child if the child were abandoned. 7 Furthermore, the judge reasoned that
the patient owed a duty to the State to care for her child.' The judge
implied that if the patient were to voluntarily die by refusing the transfusions, the patient would be neglecting her duty to the State. 9 Consequently, the judge concluded that the State could compel the patient to
receive blood transfusions."
Addressing a similar issue, the Fourth District Court of Appeal of
Florida refused to authorize life-saving blood transfusions in St. Mary's
Hospital v. Ramsey."' In Ramsey, the patient refused to consent to transfusions.22 The State alleged that if the patient died, the patient would
abandon his child even though the child lived in Michigan with her mother. The trial court refused to authorize the transfusions, reasoning that
the patient's child would not be abandoned.24 The Fourth District affirmed, implying that the child's mother already provided for most of the
child's needs. 2 Further, the court found evidence that other family mem-

P.2d at 683.
12. See Rasmussen, 741 P.2d at 685.
13. Id. at 683. The court stated a patient's "right may be limited by the State's interest in preserving life, safeguarding the integrity of the medical profession, preventing suicide, and protecting
innocent third parties." Id.
14. 331 F.2d 1000 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
15. Id. at 1002. The judge stated: "The power of a single judge to issue such emergency temporary writs cannot be disputed." Id. at 1005.
16. Id. at 1008.
17. See id.
18. Id.
19. See id.
20. Id. at 1009.
21. 465 So. 2d 666, 668-69 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985).
22. Id. at 667. The patient, a Jehovah's Witness, refused to consent, believing the ingestion of
blood to be a sin. Id. at 668.
23. See id. The patient was divorced from the child's mother. Id. at 667.
24. Id. at 668. The trial court held that the patient made a competent decision to refuse potentially life-saving blood transfusions. Id. Further, the State's interests were insufficient to overcome the
patient's right. Id.
25. See id.
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bers would help support the child. 6 Consequently, the court found that
there was insufficient evidence to support a conclusion that the patient
would abandon his child if he were to die. 7
*The Florida Supreme Court first addressed the issue of a patient's
right to refuse medical treatment in Public Health Trust v. Wons." In
Wons, the trial court authorized life-saving blood transfusions to the mother of two minor children.29 The district court reversed, concluding that
the desirability of having a two-parent home was not a compelling enough
reason to overcome the patient's right to refuse the transfusions." The
Florida Supreme Court affirmed the district court's judgment, finding no
evidence that the patient would abandon her child if she were to die.3 In
32
reaching its conclusion, the Wons court modified the law in two areas.
First, the Wons court shifted the burden of proof from the patient to the
health care provider. 33 Therefore, the patient could refuse treatment as
long as the health care provider could not prove that, in the event of
death, the patient would abandon her child.34 Second, Wons permitted the
health care provider to assert the interests of the State. 5 Thus, the health
care provider itself could seek to prevent the patient from abandoning her
child. 6
The instant court reevaluated the holdings and implications of
Wons.37 The court overruled the portion of Wons which permitted the
health care provider to represent the State's interests.3 ' However, the
court recognized that Wons had set a contrary precedent. 39 Because respondent had followed Wons when it was still good law, the court allowed
respondent standing to assert the State's interests in the instant case.'
26. Id.
27. Id. at 668-69.
28. 541 So. 2d 96 (Fla. 1989).

29. Id. at 97. The trial court reasoned that minor children have a right to be raised by two parents. Id.
30. Id.
31. See id. at 97-98. The Florida Supreme Court agreed that the nurturing two parents can pro-

vide minor children is important, but not important enough to overcome the patient's constitutional
right to refuse treatment. Id. at 97.
32. See id. at 97-98.
33. See id.at 98. The court did not specifically mention that it shifted the burden of proof. See

id.
Instead, the court just assumed that the hospital had the burden of asserting the State's interests. Id.
However, the burden of proof had been on the patient in Ramsey. See Ramsey, 465 So. 2d at 668.
34. See Wons, 541 So. 2d at 98.
35. See id. The State did not join the suit initiated by the health care provider. See id. at 97-98.
Thus, the health care provider argued on behalf of the State that the patient's children have the "right

to be reared by two loving parents." Id. at 97.
36. See id.

37. See Dubreuil, 629 So. 2d at 824-26.
38. Id. at 823.

39. See id. at 824.
40. Id. In addition, the instant court stated that the lower court already adjudicated the matter on
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The instant court noted, however, that in subsequent cases, the State must
directly protect its own interests.4 The court explicitly stated that health
care providers have no authority to act on behalf of the State.42 The instant court reasoned that the State cannot force health care providers into
the unwieldy position of arguing against their own patient's wishes.43 The
court then prescribed the health care provider's legal obligations.' Absent a judicial order to do otherwise, health care providers have an obligation to abide by the patient's decision regarding medical treatment. 45
Therefore, a health care provider cannot administer medical treatment to a
patient without the patient's consent. 6 The instant court concluded that a
health care provider could avoid any civil or criminal liability by abiding
by the patient's decision.47
After partially overruling Wons, 4 the instant court reexamined the
allocation of the burden of proof.49 The instant court followed Wons by
placing the burden of proof on the State." Therefore, respondent had to
prove that petitioner would have abandoned her children if she had died
after refusing medical treatment.5 The instant court found that respondent
did not meet its burden of proof. 2 The instant court noted that the lower
courts had failed to consider that the children's father could care for his
children if petitioner died. 3 Consequently, the court presumed that petitioner would not abandon her children if she were to die.54
To support its decision, the instant court referred to section 744.301(1)
its merits. Id. The instant court then proceeded to address the merits of the district court's judgment.
Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 823.
43. Id. The health care providers would be caught between trying to compel the patient to receive
medical treatment and trying to respect the patient's conscious choice to refuse medical treatment. Id.
44. See id. at 823-24.
45. Id. at 823. The health care provider must respect the patient's decision even if the patient will
likely die as a result. See id.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 823-24. Of course, the health care providers must act in good faith when following the
patient's decision to refuse medical treatment. Id.
48. See id. at 823; supra notes 38-47 and accompanying text (discussing the instant court's recession from Wons by requiring the State to assert its own interests).
49. See Dubreuil, 629 So. 2d at 826. Specifically, the instant court analyzed whether it should
presume the children would be abandoned. See id. at 827. If the instant court had presumed that the
children would be abandoned, petitioner would have had the burden of proof of rebutting that presumption. See id. Had the instant court instead presumed that the children would not be abandoned,
then the burden of proof would have been on respondent. See id.
50. See id. at 828. The instant court presumed the children would not be abandoned. Id. Consequently, the State had the burden of overcoming the court's presumption. Id.
51. See id. at 827.
52. Id. at 828.
53. Id. at 827.
54. Id.
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of the Florida Statutes." This statute considers both parents the natural
guardians of their children.56 As guardians, both parents are equally responsible for the children's welfare.57 According to the statute, if one
parent dies, the surviving parent becomes the children's sole guardian,
assuming responsibility for the children's welfare." Therefore, in the instant case, if petitioner were to die, the law would pass all support obligations to the children's father.59 Thus, the instant court presumed that petitioner would not abandon her children if she were to die.'
The instant court cautioned against establishing a contrary presumption.6' The court reasoned that by presuming the male parent would not
assume responsibility for his children, it would be stereotyping petitioner,
the children's mother, as the homemaker.62 Consequently, the court
wouldbe presuming that petitioner was the only parent capable of providing for the children.63 Such a presumption would directly contradict
Florida law which views both parents as the natural guardians of their
children.' Furthermore, the instant court reasoned that such a presumption would effectively deny the petitioner her right to refuse medical treatment.
In his dissent, Justice McDonald concluded that the majority should
have authorized the transfusions.'s Justice McDonald determined that
children have a right to be cared for by their mother. 7 Justice McDonald
indicated that, if the mother were to die, the children would lose that
right.8 Consequently, Justice McDonald found that the children's right to
be cared for by their mother preempted the mother's right to refuse treatment.69 He reasoned that a contrary holding would be a legal mistake
because the children would lose the nurturing of their mother." He fur-

55. Id.
56. Id. (construing FLA. STAT. § 744.301(1) (1993)).
57. Id.
58. Id. (relying on FLA. STAT. § 744.301(l) (1993)).
59. Id. This is a straight application of FLA. STAT.
court. See id.

§

744.301(1) as interpreted by the instant

60. See id.
61. Id. at 828.
62. Id. In addition, such a presumption may stereotype the male as an irresponsible parent. Id.
63. See id. This is because the male parent would be deemed unfit or too irresponsible to care for
the children. See id.
64. Id. (relying on FLA. STAT. § 61.13 (1993)).

65. See id. The court stated that the petitioner's right to refuse medical treatment was guaranteed
by the Florida Constitution. Id. (relying on FLA. CONST. art. I, §§ 3, 23).
66. Id. at 829 (McDonald, J., dissenting).
67. Id. (McDonald, J., dissenting).
68. Id. (McDonald, J., dissenting).
dissenting).
69. Id. (McDonald, J.,
70. Id. (McDonald, J., dissenting). Justice McDonald stated: "Children of tender age desperately
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ther reasoned that being a parent requires great sacrifice for the benefit of
the children.7 Justice McDonald implied that the petitioner should not be
allowed to ignore her duty to provide for and nurture her children.72
The instant case reflects two trends in the law. First, the instant case
reflects a trend of gender equality in the law.73 In Ramsey, the district
court presumed that the surviving female parent would be capable of providing for the minor child.74 By placing the burden of proof on the State,
the instant court chose to make the same presumption in favor of the
surviving parent, regardless of the gender of that parent. Thus, the instant
court presumed the male parent to be equally capable of providing for his
children.75 Therefore whether the male or female parent refused medical
treatment, the instant court would necessarily presume the parent would
not abandon his or her children.76 By making these presumptions, the
instant court judicially sanctioned the legislative policy of
gender equality
77
Statutes.
Florida
the
of
744.301(1)
section
in
recognized
If the majority had adopted Justice McDonald's dissent,78 it would
have reversed the law's current trend towards gender equality. Justice
McDonald would have authorized the transfusions, reasoning that a child
needs the nurturing of his or her mother.79 If the mother refused, the
court would simply proclaim that a child needs his or her mother and authorize the treatment."s As the majority indicated, this rationale could be
read "to perpetuate the damaging stereotype that a mother's role is one of
caregiver." 8' Such a conclusion could effectively deny the female parent
her constitutional right to refuse medical treatment. 2
Moreover, Justice McDonald's dissent would require a more compelling reason to authorize unwanted medical treatment for the male parent
than for the female parent.83 Justice McDonald's dissent only states that a
child needs his or her mother; no mention is made about a child needing

need the nurturing of a mother." Id. (McDonald, J., dissenting).
71. Id. (McDonald, J., dissenting). Justice McDonald also stated that a female parent should
sacrifice her religious beliefs, no matter how strong, for her children's welfare. Id. (McDonald, J., dissenting).
72. See id. (McDonald, J., dissenting).
73. See id. at 828; supra notes 55-57 and accompanying text.
74. 465 So. 2d at 668-69; see also supra note 23 and accompanying text.
75. See Dubreuil, 629 So. 2d at 827; supra notes 55-57 and accompanying text.
76. See Dubreuil, 629 So. 2d at 827; supra note 57 and accompanying text.
77. See supra notes 55-57 and accompanying text.
78. See Dubreuil, 629 So. 2d at 829 (McDonald, J., dissenting); supra notes 66-72 and accompanying text.
79. Dubreuil, 629 So. 2d at 829 (McDonald, J., dissenting).
80. See id. (McDonald, J., dissenting).
81. Id. at 828.
82. Id.; see also supra note 65 and accompanying text.
83. See Dubreuil, 629 So. 2d at 829 (McDonald, J., dissenting).
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his or her father.84 Necessarily, Justice McDonald rarely would authorize
treatment for the male parent. Consequently, the male parent could exercise his constitutional right to refuse treatment while the female parent
could not.8" Therefore, Justice McDonald's dissent would reverse the
law's trend of recognizing male and female parents as equals. In addition,
the dissent would perpetuate gender stereotypes, effectively treating the
female parent as the only parent capable of providing for a couple's children.86 By adopting Justice McDonald's dissent, the court would have
determined a parent's right to refuse treatment based solely on their gender." This conclusion would be contrary to the policy of gender equality
underlying section 744.301(1) of the Florida Statutes. 8
Second, the instant case reflects a trend in the law of preventing the
State from interfering with the patient's right to refuse medical treatment.
The health care provider has a legal obligation to abide by its patient's
decision regarding medical treatment unless a court orders otherwise.89
By performing its legal obligation, the health care provider cannot be held
civilly or criminally liable.' Because health care providers usually seek
judicial review to avoid liability,9' the instant court's decision will likely
reduce litigation in this area.
Moreover, health care providers can no longer represent the State in
legal actions to compel treatment of a patient. 2 In reaching this result,
the instant court rejected the notion implied in Wons that parties other than
the State could assert the State's interests.93 Now the State alone must
come before a court and obtain judicial authority to compel the treatment.94 However, health care providers have no legal obligation to notify
the State when a patient refuses treatment. 95 Because the health care pro-

84.
85.
86.
87.

See id. (McDonald, J., dissenting).
See id. (McDonald, J., dissenting); supra note 65 and accompanying text.
See Dubreuil, 629 So. 2d at 828; supra notes 61-65 and accompanying text.
See Dubreuil, 629 So. 2d at 829 (McDonald, J., dissenting).

88. See id. at 827-28.
89. Id. at 823.
90. Id. at 823-24.
91. Id. at 823. The instant court stated that "health care providers generally have sought judicial
intervention to determine their rights and obligations to avoid liability." Id.
92. Id. at 823-24; see also supra notes 38-42 and accompanying text.
93. Dubreuil, 629 So. 2d at 823; see also supra notes 38-47 and accompanying text. Presumably,
the Wons court allowed the health care provider to assert the State's interest because the patient did
not challenge the health care provider's standing. See Wons, 541 So. 2d at 97-98; supra notes 35-36
and accompanying text. Before Wons, the State always had represented its own interests in court.
Dubreuil,629 So. 2d at 823.
94. Dubreuil, 629 So. 2d at 824.
95. See id. The instant court stated only that a health care provider wishing to challenge a
patient's decision to refuse treatment must notify the State. Id. The court did not state that the health
care provider has an automatic obligation to notify the State. See id.
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vider will not be held liable for failure to notify the State,' the health
care provider is unlikely to do so. For this reason, the patient's decision to
refuse treatment will probably go unchallenged by the State.' Consequently, the State is less likely to interfere with the patient's decision to
refuse medical treatment.
The instant court judicially sanctioned a gender-neutral policy towards
parental rights.98 In doing so, the instant case assures the female parent of
her right to refuse medical treatment. At the same time, the instant case
limits the State's ability to interfere with either parent's right to refuse
treatment. Inherent in the instant decision is the possibility that the State's
interest is subordinate to the parent's right. Carried to its logical end, the
instant case may completely prevent the State from interfering with the
patient's decision to refuse medical treatment.

96.
97.
tion" by
98.

Id.
The instant court stated that the legal obligations it prescribed would reduce "needless litigathe health care providers. Id.
See id. at 827-28; supra text accompanying note 54.
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